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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order reversing a prior verdict
finding Darren Justin Carmouche to be a persistent violator of the law.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Carmouche confronted his girlfriend Kirsteen Redmond with allegations
that she had been having an affair. (Trial Tr., p. 70, L 21 - p. 74, L. 25.) She
answered his questions, but "he didn't like what [she] was telling him." (Trial Tr.,
p. 75, Ls. 1-3.) He started punching her in the face in response to her answers to
his questions. (Trial Tr., p. 75, Ls. 4-20.) After punching her in the face up to fifty
times, he escalated the violence by slamming her head into a wall. (Trial Tr., p.
76, L. 9 - p. 77, L. 19.) He then started hitting her body and legs with a baseball
bat

(Trial Tr., p. 77, L. 20 - p. 78, L. 13.)

He repeatedly choked her and

threatened to kill her and her children. (Trial Tr., p. 78, L. 16 - p. 79, L. 15; p. 81,
Ls. 6-13.)
The state charged Carmouche with attempted strangulation for choking
Redmond, second-degree kidnapping for preventing her from leaving their home
during the ongoing abuse, aggravated battery for hitting her with a baseball bat,
and felony domestic violence for punching her and striking her head against the
walls. (R., pp. 32-34, 57-59.) The state also charged sentencing enhancements
for being a persistent violator and using a deadly weapon (the bat) in the
commission of a felony. (R., pp. 40-44, 60-64.) At the conclusion of the trial the
jury convicted Carmouche of the four charged felonies. (R., pp. 133-35; Trial Tr.,
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p. 410, L. 8 - p. 411, L. 15.) The pa1iies then stipulated to waive the jury in
relation to the sentencing enhancements and continue the proceedings on those
enhancements. (Trial Tr., p. 412, L. 4- p. 416, L. 12.)
At the court trial on the enhancements the trial court concluded that
evidence establishing two felony judgments with Carmouche's name, birth date
and social security number "barely" met the state's burden of proving the
persistent violator charge and "enter[ed] judgment accordingly." (11/12/10 Tr., p.
58, L. 12- p. 60, L. 19; R. p. 140; State's Exhibits 62A, 64, 65.)
About two months after the trial on the enhancements the district judge
entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." (R., pp. 156-62.) The
judge stated he had "since reviewed the testimony and evidence presented" at
the trial on the enhancements (R., p. 156), concluded that it was "required to
make its findings as to the [enhancement] upon admissible evidence" (R., p.
161 ), and determined that the testimony regarding Carmouche's social security
number was hearsay (id.). Therefore, even though no objection to the testimony
was asserted, the testimony should be disregarded. (Id.) "The Court thus finds
and concludes that the State presented no admissible evidence as to the social
security number of the defendant at trial in this case." (Id.) The district court
then concluded that evidence establishing that both the defendant and the
person on the judgments were Darren Dustin Carmouche born on
was, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence to support the verdict that
Carmouche was a persistent violator. (R., p. 161.) The Court concluded that it
had "erred in considering the hearsay testimony as to the social security number"
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and thereby "erred in finding that the State had established the identity of the
defendant as the person formerly convicted in the two Ada County Judgments."
(R., p. 162.)
The state moved for reconsideration of the court's order finding error in its
previous verdict, asserting that, even assuming the court did not err otherwise,
the only appropriate remedy was a new trial on the persistent violator
enhancements.

(R., pp. 169-72.)

The court, however, thereafter entered a

"Judgment of Acquittal Part II Persistent Violator Allegation." (R., pp. 180-81.)
Twelve days thereafter the state filed a notice of appeal from the Judgment. (R.,
pp. 212-14.)
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by, after entering a guilty verdict on the
enhancement, sua sponte reviewing the hearing for unpreserved
evidentiary error and concluding that testimony related to Carmouche's
social security number should have been disregarded?

2.

Alternatively, even if the district court did not err by conducting its own sua
sponte review of the record for evidentiary error in the trial of the
enhancements and then ignoring competent evidence, did it err by
granting an acquittal instead of granting a new trial based on the alleged
error in the admission of evidence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Sua Sponte Reviewing The Trial For Unpreserved
Evidentiarv Error And Refusing To Consider Competent Evidence In Support Of
The Verdict

A

Introduction
During the trial Detective Angela Weekes testified without objection that

Carmouche's social security number was the same number as found on the
applicable judgments of conviction. (Compare 11/12/10 Tr., p. 27, L. 17 - p. 31,
L. 14, with State's Exhibits 64, 65.)

The district court initially rendered a

judgment finding that Carmouche was a persistent violator for having committed
two prior felonies. (11/12/10 Tr., p. 58, L. 12 - p. 60, L. 19; R. p. 140; State's
Exhibits 62A, 64, 65.) It later engaged in a sua sponte review of the record for
unpreserved evidentiary error and deemed testimony admitted without objection
to be hearsay and incompetent to support the verdict. (R., pp. 156, 161-62.) The
district court committed reversible error in its reconsideration of its judgment of
conviction for the persistent violator enhancement because it is well-established
that hearsay evidence admitted without objection is competent evidence to
support a verdict.

B.

Standard Of Review
A court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a verdict if

there is substantial competent evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007); State v. Sheahan,
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139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho
570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).

C.

The District Court Applied Incorrect Legal Standards When It Concluded
That Hearsay Evidence Admitted Without Objection Was Not Competent
Evidence To Support The Verdict
The trial court reviewed its own verdict and determined that it was

"required" to render its verdict "upon admissible evidence," and therefore, even in
the absence of an objection to Detective Weekes' testimony the court would
disregard it.

(R., p. 161.)

This is the opposite of the applicable law.

"The

general rule is that where hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it may
properly be considered in determining the facts .... " Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho
100, 105, 254 P.3d 1, 6 (2011) (citing Gem-Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Small, 90
Idaho 354, 371, 411 P.2d 943, 953 (1966)).

In addition, "hearsay evidence

admitted without objection is as strong as any other legally competent evidence."
Erhart, 151 Idaho at 105, 254 P.3d at 6 (internal quotation omitted). Were this
not so, reviewing courts would have the obligation to review the record for
unpreserved claims of error; a duty no reviewing court has. See, ShQ..., State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (unpreserved claims of
error "shall only be reviewed" if shown to be fundamental, constitutional error);
Everhart v. Washington County Rd. & Bridge Dep't, 130 Idaho 273, 274, 939
P.2d 849, 850 (1997) (Court will not review the record for error).
Because the district court undertook an independent review of the record
for unpreserved evidentiary errors, and then deemed hearsay evidence admitted
without objection to be incompetent to support its verdict, it applied an erroneous
6

legal standard. The proper legal standard would have prevented any review for
unpreserved evidentiary errors, and required the district court to treat any
hearsay admitted without objection as competent evidence supporting its verdict.
Because the district court's first verdict and judgment is, as a matter of law,
supported by competent evidence, that verdict and judgment must be reinstated.

11.
Alternatively, Even If The District Court Did Not Err By Conducting Its Own Sua
Sponte Review For Evidentiary Error And Excluding Competent Evidence, It
Erred By Granting An Acquittal Instead Of A New Trial

A.

Even If The Challenged Evidence Was Improperly Admitted. At Most
Carmouche Was Entitled To A New Trial
Alternatively, even if the district court had not committed reversible error in

its review of the guilty verdict, it did commit reversible error by granting an
acquittal instead of a new trial. The proper remedy for the erroneous admission
of hearsay 1 in a trial is not an acquittal but a new trial.

l i State v.

Watkins, 148

Idaho 418, 224 P.3d 485 (2009) (case remanded for new trial following
determination of erroneous admission of hearsay evidence); State v. Hansen,
133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999) (remedy granted for
erroneous and non-harm less admission of hearsay evidence was to "vacate the
judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial").
In State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho
Court of Appeals found error in the admission of copies of a North Dakota

1

The state asserts that the social security number obtained from !LETS (11/12/10
Tr., p. 28, L. 23 - p. 33, L. 17) was properly admitted as coming from a
trustworthy public record. I.RE. 803(8).
7

judgment of conviction to prove a DUI enhancement. !Q_,_ at 892-93, 231 P.3d at
537-38 (the trial court "erred in admitting the copies pertaining to Moore's North
Dakota conviction" because they were not properly authenticated). After finding
reversible error, the court concluded it "must determine the remedy appropriate
for such an error." !Q_,_ at 893, 231 P.3d at 538. The court stated the general law
that double jeopardy does not prevent a re-trial where the defendant secures
reversal "on grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence." !Q_,_ (emphasis
original). The court noted that the Supreme Court of the United States had held
that in reviewing for the sufficiency of the evidence all the evidence considered
by the jury must be included regardless of its admissibility. !Q_,_ at 894, 231 P.3d
at 539 (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988)). The Court adopted the
same approach, reviewed all the evidence admitted and determined it sufficient,
concluded that the error was therefore mere trial error, and remanded for a new
trial. Moore, 148 Idaho at 894, 231 P.3d at 539.
The same analysis applies here.

Reviewing all the admitted evidence

shows two prior judgments of conviction identifying Carmouche as the defendant
by first, middle and last name; date of birth; and social security number.
Carmouche is therefore not entitled to an acquittal under double jeopardy. The
proper remedy for what was at most mere trial error is therefore a new trial.
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B.

Even Excluding The Alleged Hearsay The Evidence Was Sufficient
The evidence in this case, even excluding the social security number

evidence, was sufficient to uphold the verdict.

The evidence established that

Carmouche's full name was "Darren Dustin Carmouche" and that his date of birth
was

(State's Exhibit 62A.) The evidence also established that in

2000 "Darren Dustin Carmouche" with a date of birth of

was convicted

of two felonies for possession of a controlled substance and forgery of a financial
transaction card (State's Exhibit 64) and in 2001 "Darren Dustin Carmouche" with
a date of birth of

as convicted of felony possession of a controlled

substance (State's Exhibit 65).

This overwhelming evidence proves the

enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court apparently concluded that the fact that the crimes of
conviction (domestic violence and battery) were not the same as the prior crimes
(controlled substances and forgery) and that the prior convictions happened in a
different county was sufficient, as a matter of law, to create reasonable doubt.
(R., p. 161 (state had to prove "the same name, same date of birth, same

offense, and same county of conviction").)

This was legally erroneous.

To

establish the enhancement the state was required to prove only that Carmouche
had been previously convicted of two felonies.

l.C. § 19-2514.

The statute

clearly does not prevent a finding of the identity element of the crime unless the
prior conviction is for the same type of crime in the same county.
Nor is the fact that the prior convictions were for different types of crimes
in a different county truly significant in this case.
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The prior crimes were for

possession of controlled substances and the present crimes of violence were
committed after extensive use of and while under the influence of controlled
substances.

(Trial Tr., p. 73, Ls. 8-23.)

The prior convictions were in Ada

County, but Carmouche's address on his driver's license was in Meridian,
establishing a clear connection with Ada County.

(State's Exhibit 62A.) The

different nature of the crimes and the different counties they were committed in
simply did not show that a different person with exactly the same name and birth
date had been convicted of the prior felonies.

Because the evidence that

Carmouche was a persistent violator was overwhelming, the trial court erred by
reversing its prior guilty verdict and judgment.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
judgment of acquittal, reinstate the verdict finding Carmouche is a persistent
violator, and remand for a new sentencing.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of June 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARA B. THOMAS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/pm
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